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ABSTRACT
With respect to security, sensor networks have a number of considerations that separate them from traditional distributed systems.
First, sensor devices are typically vulnerable to physical compromise. Second, they have significant power and processing constraints. Third, the most critical security issue is protecting the (statistically derived) aggregate output of the system, even if individual
nodes may be compromised. We suggest that these considerations
merit a rethinking of traditional security techniques: rather than
depending on the resilience of cryptographic techniques, in this
paper we develop new techniques to tolerate compromised nodes
and to even mislead an adversary. We present our initial work on
probabilistically quantifying the security of sensor network protocols, with respect to sensor data distributions and network topologies. Beginning with a taxonomy of attacks based on an adversary’s goals, we focus on how to evaluate the vulnerability of sensor
network protocols to eavesdropping. Different topologies and aggregation functions provide different probabilistic guarantees about
system security, and make different trade-offs in power and accuracy.
Categories and Subject Descriptors: C.2.0 [ComputerCommunication Networks]: Security and Protection
General Terms: Security
Keywords: Wireless Sensor Networks, Eavesdropping, Data
Streams, Probability Distribution.

1.

INTRODUCTION

As sensor network technology advances, security and privacy
concerns will increasingly move to the forefront. Many real-world
settings in which sensors might be deployed (e.g., security systems,
intelligent buildings, hospitals, automated warehouses) have significant need not only for privacy policies, but mechanisms for enforcing data security and confidentiality.
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In the Aspenn (Abstraction-based Sensor Programming Environment from Penn) project, we focus on developing the infrastructure for such rich sensor applications, in which the sensing devices
and networks may be heterogeneous (including smart card readers,
video cameras, and mobile sensors) and the sensor network may interact with external data sources on the Internet. A major emphasis
of our work lies in protecting application data from eavesdroppers
and hackers.
With respect to security, the sensor network domain has several
important characteristics that differentiate it from traditional distributed systems. First, sensor devices are frequently vulnerable to
physical compromise or local eavesdropping, as they are embedded within an environment. Second, sensor devices have significant power and processing constraints, which often prevent them
from running expensive encryption protocols, but which also limit
the amount of “damage” they can do to the overall sensor network
(e.g., by injecting spurious data or snooping on large volumes of
messages). Third, sensor network applications are generally consensus or aggregation-based, meaning that compromising one or a
few nodes may not significantly affect the overall system.
To this point, security techniques have been adapted for the sensor network domain by reducing the computation requirements of
cryptography (generally by pre-distributing keys [18] or reducing
the key size [2]) in order to operate under the limited processing
capabilities of sensor networks. However, cryptography is not the
only means of providing security in a sensor network application
— in fact, if an attacker has sufficient resources, cryptographic
schemes with small key sizes may provide little protection. Moreover, such techniques do not consider the system-wide effects if an
attacker compromises a few nodes.
We advocate a different approach, which takes advantage of the
fact that any real-world attacker is limited by the properties of
the system he or she is attempting to compromise. In this paper
we present an initial framework, taxonomy, and methodology for
quantifying the privacy and security of sensor network applications,
under the assumption that some nodes may be compromised, and
based on the networks’ size, protocols, and computations. Rather
than providing all-or-nothing guarantees about privacy or security,
our goal is to examine probabilistic guarantees with respect to
compromise, and to understand and improve existing aggregation
strategies with respect to these guarantees. Our focus in this paper is on the problem of eavesdropping, although we are currently
generalizing to other types of attacks. Specifically, we make the
following contributions:
• We propose a taxonomy of attack models for sensor networks, based on the goals of the attacker.

• We propose what we believe to be the first quantitative approach to assessing system-level confidentiality and security,
under the possibility that some nodes are compromised.
• We show how our methods can be used to choose between
different protocols and sampling strategies.
• We discuss how cryptographic and non-cryptographic techniques can be used to improve the confidentiality of a sensor
network.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2,
we introduce a taxonomy of attacks in sensor networks. In the subsequent section, we develop a model for cost and accuracy in a
sensor network. Section 4 discusses how we model an attacker’s
ability to determine the output of a sensor network, and also her
cost. Next, we identify and assess potential means of combating
eavesdropping. We discuss related work in Section 6, and in Section 7 we conclude by highlighting avenues for future work.

2.

TAXONOMY OF ATTACKER MODELS

By compromising nodes, eavesdropping, or spoofing, an adversary may attempt to violate the security of a sensor network application. In order to evaluate a sensor application’s security characteristics, we must first understand the potential goals of the adversary’s attack. We define a taxonomy of attack models for sensor
networks, based on the goals of the adversary.
1. Eavesdropping. Here, the adversary (eavesdropper) aims to
determine the aggregate data that is being output by the sensor network: it is attempting to see what the system is observing, e.g., to predict how the owner of the sensor network
will react. The adversary either listens to messages transmitted by the nodes, or directly compromises those nodes. We
further distinguish between two types of eavesdropping:
(a) Passive: The eavesdropper conceals her presence from
the sensor nodes and uses only the broadcast medium
to eavesdrop on all messages.
(b) Active: The eavesdropper actively attempts to discern
information by sending queries to sensors or aggregation points, or by attacking sensor nodes.
2. Disruption. The intent of the adversary is to disrupt the sensor application. This can be a combination of two types of
techniques:
(a) Semantic: The adversary injects messages, corrupts data,
or changes values in order to render the aggregated data
corrupt or useless.
(b) Physical: The adversary upsets sensor readings by directly manipulating the environment. For example, generating heat in the vicinity of sensors will result in erroneous values being reported.
3. Hijacking. This variation on the disruption model is a case in
which the adversary attempts to direct the aggregated output
of the sensor application towards a value of her choosing.
If the adversary gains control of enough sensors, then this
attack is the hardest to counter.
Our focus. In this paper, which forms the first step towards addressing the attack models of our taxonomy, we focus strictly on
the case of eavesdropping. As stated above, we assume that the

adversary’s goal is to ascertain the aggregated values output by the
network: while subtly different from the alternative definition —
attempting to precisely ascertain information about the sensed environment — we believe this is a more likely motivation for attacking a sensor network. In our definition, what we are trying to
protect is what the system sees, and thus the ability to predict how
the user of the system might react, as opposed to merely protecting
information about the environment. We note that our methods can
generalize to handling the latter case as well: the two definitions
will essentially coincide if we constrain our sensor network application to return the most accurate information possible about the
environment.
In the next two sections, we first define our network model and
means for determining cost; then we discuss how we evaluate networks’ vulnerability to eavesdropping — first for height-two aggregation trees, and then for trees of arbitrary depth.

3. SENSOR NETWORK MODEL
We begin by introducing our model of a sensor network, beginning by examining how computation is performed, and then quantifying the quality (accuracy) of the network and its cost. These
factors, as well as the vulnerability of the network to eavesdropping
(next section) will form the basis of assessing sensor networks.

3.1 Streams and Aggregation
Data from sensors is typically continuous and time-varying, as
opposed to actually having discrete values; a formal stream model,
similar to that of [1], is appropriate to capture this aspect of data.
D EFINITION 1. (Sensor Stream) A Sensor Stream R is a possibly infinite sequence of elements, {hid, d, τ, ρin }n≥1 , where id ∈
Z+ is a identifier for the sensor, d is a sensor data structure, τ is
the timestamp and ρ is either ∅ or the location of the sensor.
2
We reason about two orthogonal types of aggregation over streams:
in-stream aggregation, which occurs over a single stream, generally
over a time window, and multi-stream aggregation, which occurs
across the values of multiple streams, either at the same time or
over a time window.
In-stream aggregation can be thought of as aggregation over all
data from a single sensor within some time window. We can also
define aggregation over streams of data from different sensors within
the same time window. We refer to this form of aggregation as
multi-stream aggregation.

3.2 Hierarchical Aggregation
For purposes of formal analysis, we abstract away specific details
of sensing, communication and computation and view the network
from a pure data collection and aggregation perspective. The hierarchical aggregation tree is a recursive structure in which, at each
level of the tree, groups of child nodes send their values to a parent
node that aggregates their values. The base station is the intermediate point at the highest level. Our model is consistent with most
proposed aggregation algorithms, e.g. [16, 23, 11].
Finally, we assume that the values observed at each sensor are
not identical, but can be characterized according to some probabilistic data distribution. Data from a sensor network will typically
consist of a number of observed attributes; a probability density
function (pdf) can be used to assign a probability for each possible
assignment to the attributes. Such a model can be learned from data
collected over time, using algorithms such as those in [17]. Learning a model involves maintaining certain parameters, e.g., the mean
and the variance, and coping with noise, outliers, etc. A significant
literature exists on learning models of streams, (e.g., [3, 5]).

Many sensor applications include multiple, dynamic attributes,
and hence correlations and temporal aspects to the data distribution
must also be considered. In [8], the authors used Markovian models
to learn the time-varying effects of sensor readings. In their model,
given the value of all attributes at time t, it is assumed that the value
of the attributes at time t + 1 are independent of those for any time
earlier than t. This is generally sufficient to capture the dynamic
nature of the sensor data. The same authors have extended their
work in [7] to consider correlations between streams.
Our work assumes that such distributions are given (or can be
reasonably approximated). Based on knowledge of the data distribution, we can provide specific probabilistic guarantees about sensing and eavesdropping. Additional information, such as the spatial
distribution of sensors, is not assumed, although it can add to the
precision of the metrics we present.
We illustrate an example aggregation tree in Figure 1, where
nodes s0 , . . . , s5 are in a hierarchical group. Each of s1 , . . . , s5
perform aggregation of data in sub-groups and combine their own
data with this before forwarding it to node s0 . Node s0 , in addition
to recording its own sensor data, is also the final aggregator for all
the data in the network.

s2
s1

3.3 Quality of the Sample
Given a model of the distribution of data readings in the environment, there are several possible metrics for estimating the quality
(accuracy) of the sample. We assume that the readings used to
produce a single aggregate stream element occur within some time
window [T, T + ∆]. The length of the window, ∆, is applicationspecific, and it corresponds to the common notion of an epoch [16]
during which computations are performed, but it allows readings to
occur at any point within the window.
In statistics, goodness-of-fit is used to measure the distance between the data and the hypothesis. For example, if the underlying
distribution is normal, then goodness-of-fit can be determined by
using the standard χ2 test. We adopt a statistic that works better for small samples and is simple to compute, the KolmogorovSmirnov test [12]. To compare a data sample consisting of N
events whose cumulative distribution is SN (x) with a hypothesis
function whose cumulative distribution is Φ(x), the value η is calculated as η = maxx |SN (x) − Φ(x)|.The Cramer-Smirnov-VonMises test is often used to test that a one-dimensional data sample
is compatible with being a random sampling from a given distribution: If the density function of the data is f (x), then, the test
2
measures
R ∞ the goodness-of-fit by the measure W , which is given
by −∞ [SN (x)−F (x)]2f (x)dx. There are many alternative tests,
depending on the distribution of data; for details we refer the reader
to a standard textbook on statistics (e.g., [12]).

s0
s3
s5

s4

E XAMPLE 2. If we assume that the data in Example 1 is distributed N(5,0.1) and use the χ2 test as the goodness-of-fit measure,
P
we have ∆ = 20s and 5i=0 (s¯i −4.96)
= 0.911, which implies
0.1
that we have a sample close to the actual model.
2

3.4 Cost of Sensing
Figure 1: Sensor network model
We consider the presence of a powerful adversary who has the
capability of listening to the messages in the sensor network, or of
compromising sensor nodes in an undetectable way, with a certain
probability. The higher a compromised node is in the aggregation
tree, the more power the attacker has.
Notation. We denote the set of all sensor data streams within a
group in the hierarchical network with the symbol S. Some subset,
SC ⊆ S of these data values will be used to compute the stream
aggregate σ (this quantity considers the possibility of dropped messages, filtering, sampling, etc.). The adversary can eavesdrop on
some set of nodes SA ⊆ S, which may overlap with but differ
from SC .
E XAMPLE 1. Consider, the situation depicted in Figure 1, where
the top-level group of an activity monitoring sensor network has
nodes s0 , . . . , s5 . Assume the sensors s1 , . . . s5 perform their local
aggregation tasks and output their values to node s0 once every 5
seconds. Also assume that the values from all data streams have the
in-stream aggregation function σ1 to be the mean of all the readings obtained at each node si over the past 4 sampling intervals.
Let the multi-stream aggregation (σ2 ) be applied every 20 seconds,
as the mean of the readings from s0 , . . . , s5 .
If readings from s0 are {4.82, 4.81, 4.82, 4.83}, then σ1 (s0 ) =
4.82. Similarly, if σ1 (s1 ) = 4.93, σ(s2 ) = 5.17, σ1 (s3 ) = 4.92,
σ1 (s4 ) = 4.87, σ1 (s5 ) = 5.04 and we compute the mean over all
streams, then σ2 (S) = 4.96.
2

We can estimate the cost of producing a single output element in
the sensor network by considering the cost of acquiring and communicating the sensor readings. Let the time window be T =
[T, T + ∆], the cost of acquiring a reading at sensor node s be
ca (s), and the cost of transmitting a message from sensor s to the
aggregating point s0 be ct (s). Then
P the cost of acquiring the data
to be aggregated is Ca (T , S) =
s∈S ca (s). For each intermediate node in the aggregation
tree,
the
cost of transmitting sensor
P
data is Ct (T , S) = s∈S ct (s), where ct (s0 ) = 0. (This is because there is no transmission involved from s0 to itself). Let the
reception cost for one reading at s0 be cr . Then, the total cost of reception Cr (T , S\S0 ) = |S\S0 | · cr where S0 is the set of readings
obtained at s0 . Thus, the total cost for acquiring and aggregating
the data is C(T , S) = Ca (T , S) + Ct (T , S) + Cr (T , S\S0 ) for
any set S of nodes that share a single aggregation point s0 .
E XAMPLE 3. Let us assume that the cost of sensing for attribute is 0.015J and transmitting and receiving data takes 0.025J
of energy for all the sensors in Example 1. In one epoch, the sensors transmit 20
= 4 packets. Hence, C(S) = 5 × 4 × (0.025 +
5
0.015) + 4 × 0.015J + 5 × 4 × 0.025J = 1.36J.
2

4. MODELING EAVESDROPPING
We now consider the case of an adversary who has access to
some of the sensor readings (either through eavesdropping or compromise), and who is trying to determine the aggregate value output
by the sensor network.1 We consider the confidentiality of the network, in terms of whether the adversary can estimate the output
1
As described in Section 2, this definition is motivated by the fact
that the eavesdropper is most likely to be interested in predicting the
behavior of the person or application monitoring the sensor data.

value within some small tolerance δ. We compute the eavesdropping vulnerability based on several important parameters. First,
there is the probability that a compromised set of sensor nodes,
SA , greatly resembles the set of nodes that our application is sampling, SC . This probability is a function of the size of SC , the
specific aggregate function σ, and the data distribution of the sensors S. For example, if all sensors produce the same reading, then
the adversary can compromise the system from a single reading.
We formalize the probability based on these parameters.
D EFINITION 2. (Eavesdropping Vulnerability) The eavesdropping vulnerability (γ) relative to a set of compromised nodes is defined as γ(σ, S, SA , SC , δ) = p (|σ(SC ) − σ(SA )| ≤ δ), where σ
is the aggregating function and δ the adversary’s error tolerance.
2
Although we have considered a single aggregate computation
here, the eavesdropping vulnerability can be generalized to support multiple aggregate computations over different attributes: the
expected value of γ can be obtained by conditioning on different
parameters.
We can compute the expected eavesdropping
Pvulnerability, in
which the specific SA is unknown, as γ̄ =
s p(SA = s) ·
I(|σ(SC ) − σ(s)| ≤ δ), where I is an indicator function that
evaluates to 1 if the condition is true and 0 otherwise.
This relies on knowledge of the underlying sensor value distribution of S, and the specific aggregation function, σ. We now show
the derivation of γ values for the most common sensor aggregation functions (min, max, sum, avg and median) over single attributes with discrete distributions:
• Min/Max: I(| min(SC ) − min(SA )| ≤ δ) = 1 if min(SA )
lies between [min(SC ) − δ, min(SC ) + δ]. If f is the probability density function (pdf) and Φ is the cumulative density function (cdf) of the distribution of S, then, for any j,
f (j) is the probability of obtaining a j and (1 − Φ(j)) is
the probability that a reading is greater than j. Thus in a
sample of size i, j will be the minimum with probability
f (j) (1 − Φ(j))i−1 . Therefore:
γ̄ =

|S|
X

bmin(SC )+δc

X

p(|SA | = i)

i=1

f (j) · (1 − Φ(j))i−1

j=dmin(SC )−δe

(1)
Using a similar argument for Max, we get:
γ̄ =

|S|
X

bmin(SC )+δc

p(|SA | = i)

i=1

X

f (j) · Φ(j)i−1

(2)

j=dmin(SC )−δe

• Sum: I(|sum(SC ) − sum(SA )| ≤ δ) = 1 if sum(SA ) lies
between [sum(SC ) − δ), sum(SC ) + δ)]. If f|SA | is the pdf
of the sum of variables and Φ|SA | is the cdf of the sum of
variables, we get:
γ̄ =

|S|
X

`
´
p(|SA | = i) · Φ|SA | (u) − Φ|SA | (l)

(3)

i=1

where u = (sum(SC ) + δ) and l = (sum(SC ) − δ).
• Avg: I(|avg(SC ) − avg(SA )| ≤ δ) = 1 if sum(SA ) lies
between [|SA |(avg(SC ) − δ), |SA |(avg(SC ) + δ)]. If f|SA |
is the pdf of the sum of variables and Φ|SA | is the cdf of the

sum of variables, then with a similar argument as before, we
get:
γ̄ =

|S|
X

`
´
p(|SA | = i) · Φ|SA | (u) − Φ|SA | (l)

(4)

i=1

where u = i(avg(SC ) + δ) and l = i(avg(SC ) − δ).
• Median: I(|med(SC ) − med(SA )| ≤ δ) = 1 if med(SA )
lies in [med(SC ) − δ, med(SC ) + δ]. If f be the probability density function (pdf),and Φ is the cumulative density
function (cdf) of distribution of S, then, for any j, f (j) is
the probability of obtaining a j, Φ(j) is the probability that a
reading is less than j, and (1 − Φ(j)) is the probability that
a reading is greater than j. Thus in a sample of size i, j will
be the median with probability,
` ´
i
i
p(j) = b ii c · f (j) · Φ(j)b 2 c · (1 − Φ(j))i−b 2 c−1 .
2
Therefore:
γ̄ =

|S|
X
i=1

bmin(SC )+δc

p(|SA | = i)

X

p(j)

(5)

j=dmin(SC )−δe

2
E XAMPLE 4. To evaluate the expected value of γ for the application in Example 1, let us assume that the probability of the
adversary eavesdropping on a single node is 0.2 and the data is distributed as N (5, 0.1). Also, let the tolerance δ = 0.1. Noting that
we have σ2 (S) = 4.96, we can use
P Equation (4) to evaluate the
expected probability. We get γ̄ = 5i=1 pi · (Φ(5.06) − Φ(4.86))
2
, which on evaluation yields γ̄ = 0.2499. This agrees with our
intuition that if the adversary is able to compromise one node, then
she is far from being able to estimate the aggregate of the network
consisting of 5 nodes.
2

4.1 Hierarchical Aggregation
Thus far, we have only considered aggregation within a group
with a single aggregation point. We now generalize to eavesdropping over hierarchical groups: the goal is to consider how close the
adversary gets to an aggregate value higher in the tree when she
eavesdrops on data in the lower levels comprising that group. (If
we assume that the adversary eavesdrops only at one level, then
this problem is identical to the one considered above.) The higher
the adversary listens, the closer she gets to aggregate of the whole
network.
An example scenario is depicted in Figure 1, where we assume
that the adversary has eavesdropped on groups with nodes s1 , . . . , s5
as the nodes responsible for aggregation. Now, we want to know
how close she gets to the aggregate at s0 .
The probability of adversary learning the result of aggregation
at a level l is called the eavesdropping vulnerability over a hierarchy and is denoted by γl , where l indicates the hierarchical level
from which the adversary listens with the goal of compromising the
l
l
, SC
,σ
overall system. As with γ, γl will be a function of S l , SA
and δ. We consider the effect of a lower-level compromise on a
higher-level node to be
compromise” of the higher node,
S a “partial
l−1
l
), l > 1. Note that the adversary’s
i.e., we define SA
= i σ(SA
i
l−1
set at level l is the union of sets σ(SA
), which accounts for the
i
fact that the sensor values at level l will be aggregates of values at
level l − 1.
2
These values can be found by converting it into standard normal
form for which Φ is well tabulated.

D EFINITION 3. (Eavesdropping Vulnerability over a Hierarchy)
The eavesdropping vulnerability (γl ) for the `adversary over a hier- ´
l
l
l
l
archy is defined as γl (σ, S l , SA
, SC
, δ) = p |σ(SC
) − σ(SA
)| ≤ δ ,
where σ is S
the aggregating function and δ is the error in estimate,
l−1
l
and SA
= i σ(SA
), l ≥ 1.
2
i
Note that with this definition, γ = γ0 . We can compute γl by
l
conditioning on various parameters. For example, knowing σ, S l , SC
and δ, we can compute:
X
l−1
l−1
p(SA
, . . . , SA
) · I(d ≤ δ)
(6)
γl =
n
1
l−1
l−1
SA ,...,SA
n
1

l
l
where d = |σ(SC
) − σ(SA
)|.
Computing γl , in general, involves knowing how much the data
from different groups are related. If the data from different groups
at level l−1 are correlated, then computing γl can be quite difficult.
Correlations between groups are also undesirable because they can
help the adversary can make a good estimate by eavesdropping on
only a few groups.
Although the exact computation of γl is generally difficult, an
approximate answer by making some simplifying assumptions, such
as simultaneous eavesdropping in all the groups. The example below illustrates this idea.

E XAMPLE 5. Consider the scenario in Example 1. Let us assume that each of the nodes s0 , . . . , s5 are themselves aggregating
data in their groups and that the distribution in each group is as
follows: s1 : N (4.9, 1), s2 : N (4.8, 1), s3 : N (4.8, 1), s4 :
N (5, 1), s5 : N (5.2, 1), and the data from node s0 is distributed
N (5, 1). If the data at this level is being averaged, the resulting average will be normally distributed with mean 5+4.9+4.8+4.8+5+5.2
6
and a standard deviation 1+1+1+1+1+1
, which has distribution
36
N (4.95, 0.16). Now, if the probability of eavesdropping simultaneously in P
every group is 0.5, the eavesdropping vulnerability for
δ = 0.1 is 5i=1 (0.5)i · (Φ(5.06) − Φ(4.86)) = 0.4599.
2

4.2 Performance Ratio
The eavesdropping vulnerability γ or γl gives us the probability
that an adversary can obtain a good estimate of the actual aggregate.
Obviously, we would like to design sensor networks that minimize
this probability; however, to do this, we will generally have to incur
additional overhead.
If we use benefit to mean how close an estimate is to the target (in the case of our application, this is the “real” aggregate;
in the case of the adversary, this is our network’s aggregate), we
can define a performance ratio to compare different sensor network
schemes. We define the performance ratio of the adversary relative
to a set of compromised nodes, ρA , as: ρA (σ, S, SA , SC , δ, C) =
γ(σ,S,SA ,SC ,δ)
. The increase in cost incurred to reduce γ can be
Cr (SA )
0

measured by CC(S)
. Here, C is the cost model for any eavesdropping0
(S)
tolerant data protocol and C is the cost model for the standard
streaming model, as defined earlier. We can now define the performance ratio of a sensor network, ρ, as:
0

ρ(σ, S, SA , SC , δ, C, C ) =

1
C(S)
·
(7)
ρA (σ, S, SA , SC , δ, C) C 0 (S)

We can calculate the expected value of ρ by conditioning on various
parameters. Ideally, we would like to design our data protocol to
maximize ρ as much as possible.
E XAMPLE 6. Consider the application in Example 1 with the
cost as computed in Example 3. We assume that the probability of

the adversary eavesdropping on a node is 0.2, yielding a cost of
P5 (Φ(5.06)−Φ(4.86))·pi
= 1.799. ρ̄ can
0.025 ∗ 4J = 0.1J.
i=1
0.1i
1
1.36
now be computed as, 1.799
· 1.36
= 0.5558. Intuitively, higher cost
for the adversary increases the ratio ρ. If we make it harder for
the adversary to eavesdrop, say reducing the probability of eavesdropping on a single node to 0.1, then we will have, ρ̄ = 1.2248.
Techniques for increasing performance ratio are discussed in the
next section.
2
To increase the quality of the sample, we need more observations
(SC ), which, however, increases both cost and (if the distribution
of values remains the same) γ. Hence, we can identify a trade-off
between quality, cost, and having a eavesdropping vulnerability.

5. COUNTERMEASURES AGAINST
EAVESDROPPING
Given our understanding of the factors that affect eavesdropping
potential, we now present some general techniques to thwart adversaries. We distinguish between traditional, cryptographic techniques and non-cryptographic schemes.

5.1 Cryptographic techniques
Encryption and authentication using cryptographic techniques
makes a system significantly more secure against eavesdropping
and other attacks. Encryption can be used to keep data secure
from the adversary, and authentication can be used to safeguard
against spurious data. In essence, these techniques attempt to ensure system-level confidentiality by protecting all links. For the
sensor network environment, symmetric key techniques are most
commonly used, but it is unclear how to manage keys and how to
justify the overhead of encryption. Among the many prior works on
cryptographic techniques for privacy in wireless sensor networks,
[18] and [15] describe methods to achieve authenticity and confidentiality.
However, many approaches (e.g., [19, 9]) assume a pre-key distribution which impedes network creation and makes dynamic membership difficult. In [4], Chan and Perrig advocate that end-to-end
encryption is not possible for sensor networks and foresee new
methods as the solution. Moreover, encryption may not help if the
nodes themselves can be compromised. Taking our cue from these
points, we briefly suggest several alternatives below.

5.2 Non-cryptographic techniques
Non-cryptographic techniques make it harder to eavesdrop by
reducing the chance that an adversary’s sensor data sample SA
matches the system’s sample SC .
Data Filtering or Compensation. One technique is to deliberately send spurious data (or data with spurious offsets) from the
sensors, and to filter the noise at the aggregating point. After filtering, the resulting data set will comprise legitimate information
about the underlying network. The adversary, who is not aware of
this shared information, will see data that follows a different distribution.
One such idea, which we are investigating extensively, is termed
confusion [6]. Under such a scheme, whenever the sensor wishes to
transmit a message, it appends the shared secret (token) to the message. A set of confusion-generating nodes then could inject spurious data, which is indistinguishable to a third party, into the network. Such confusion messages could be generated either by third
party nodes or be a subset of sensors themselves. At the receiving
end, the secret can be used to separate the legitimate message from
the noise. Yet while the aggregate node can filter out superfluous

messages from confusers, an eavesdropper with incomplete knowledge cannot make such distinctions. Since the eavesdropper is not
aware of which tokens belong to the sensors and which belong to
the confusers, she cannot identify the legitimate messages. Thus, if
she ends up accepting the “noise,” she will end up with a different
distribution of the data in the network.
As with encryption techniques, a confusion-based technique assumes a shared secret unique to a sensor, but it may may require
less computational power per sensor node, it is tolerant to the compromise of a few nodes, and it is resistant to active eavesdropping.
The savings on per-device power in the confusion-based approach
comes from the fact that there is no need for the expensive exponentiation operations involved in encryption. Confusion does require
more message transmissions, but these can be amortized by adding
greater numbers of devices.
E XAMPLE 7. Consider the application in Example 1. Suppose
the sensors double their transmission rate by injecting a spurious value for every legitimate one. Assume that the legitimate
data is distributed within the range N (5, 0.1), while the spurious data ensures the adversary’s sample will be uniformly distributed in [4, 7]. Given the model of Example 6, the cost is C(S) =
8 × 5 × (0.025 + 0.015) + 4 × 0.015 + 8 × 5 × 0.025J = 2.66J.
P5 (Φ(5.06)−Φ(4.86))·pi
= 0.1492. ρ̄ can now be computed as,
i=1
0.1i
1.36
1
·
=
3.4267.
Clearly,
this technique greatly reduces
0.1492
2.66
the vulnerability of the network, when compared to the baseline
model’s ρ̄ = 0.5558.
Data cloaking [10] has been proposed as another approach to
achieving privacy in sensor networks. Cloaking of data involves
perturbing the data by a predefined offset. This has been used to
achieve anonymity within a network. A similar idea can also be
used to counter eavesdropping: 1) First, nodes are partitioned into
disjoint subsets. 2) Then, based on a shared secret, each node
within a partition is assigned an offset. This offset is added to
the actual sensor reading before transmission. Ideally, this offset
should be unique to a partition. 3) At the point of aggregation, the
appropriate offset is subtracted from the reading before aggregation.
Although this scheme requires maintaining a node-to-offset mapping at the aggregating point, it can easily be obviated by having
all the nodes within a partition transmit within a time slot. With
such a routing protocol, only the mapping of different time slots to
the offset would have to be stored and this information is modest
compared the original mapping.
The adversary, who has no information about the offset, will be
readily misled by the transmitted information. Even if she manages to compromise a few nodes and learn the offset information,
the damage is limited to members of the partition with the compromised nodes.
E XAMPLE 8. Consider the scenario in Example 1. Let us assume that the nodes s1 , . . . , s5 are themselves aggregation point
of their groups and their data is distributed as N (5, 1). Also,
let the data at node s0 be also distributed N (5, 1). If average is
the aggregation function used, it will be normally distributed with
mean 5×6
= 5 and standard deviation 1×6
= 0.16. If we as6
36
sume that the probability of eavesdropping
message is
P5 on a single
0.5, the eavesdropping vulnerability is i=1 (0.5)i · (Φ(5.06) −
Φ(4.86)) = 0.9843 × 0.4553 = 0.4482.
Now, if we assume that each sensor i, i ∈ {0, . . . , 5} adds an
offset 0.1i, which is subtracted out at s0 , then the average will
be normally distributed with mean 5+5.1+5.2+5.3+5.4+5.5
= 5.25
6

= 0.16. In this case, the eavesdropand standard deviation 1×6
36P
ping vulnerability will be 5i=1 (0.5)i · (Φ(5.06) − Φ(4.86)) =
0.9843 × 0.1101 = 0.1083. which is a clear reduction in eavesdropping vulnerability from 0.4482 without using the offsets.
2
Attribute-value Correlation. Yet another possibility is to use correlations between different attributes. If the application at hand is
temperature monitoring and a sensor’s temperature and voltage are
correlated, then, for instance, the sensors might transmit voltages
in certain cases, and temperatures the remainder of the time. If we
assume that the adversary does not have the correlation model, then
such data will be useless to her. Constructing correlations between
attributes has been previously studied (e.g., [7]), with the objective of reducing the cost for the network. Here we use it as shared
information. Importantly, it takes a considerable amount of time,
energy, and node samples to learn this correlation model, meaning that an attacker would need to devote significant resources to
compromising a large portion of the system.
E XAMPLE 9. Again consider Example 7, with the modification
that with probability 0.5, the sensors send voltage readings. Further, they also output as many spurious messages as temperature
readings, in order to ensure that the adversary’s distribution is uniformly distributed in [4, 7]. In this case, C(S) = ( 21 × 8 + 21 × 4) ×
5 × (0.025 + 0.015) + 4 × 0.015 + 21 × 8 + 21 × 4) × 5 × (0.025) =
1
1.76J, ρ̄ can now be computed as, 0.1492
· 1.36
= 5.1791. which
1.76
is better than strictly using the filtering/compensation approach.

6. RELATED WORK
Prior works on sensor security [22, 14] present attack models,
but our focus and attack taxonomy are a more general classification
based on the goals of the adversary, and our focus is on the security
of the overall system even when individual nodes are compromised.
There is also a significant literature on quantifying security in
a context-specific way. [13] presents a quantitative model of the
security intrusion process based on attacker behavior: their model
is based on empirical data collected from intrusion experiments.
[20] quantifies security strength and risk using economic criteria.
It should be noted that though these are general methods, their applicability to sensor networks is uncertain. Our approach, in contrast, is based on data models for different applications of sensor
networks.
The idea of developing a probabilistic model for data aggregation in sensor networks was introduced in [8]. We can use the same
techniques to learn a model from the data. However, our focus is
on using the model to understand the security vulnerabilities of a
sensor network, as opposed to minimizing power usage in computing aggregates. This slightly resembles the resilient techniques
for data aggregation of [21], although we focus on quantitatively
ascertaining robustness in the presence of an adversary.

7. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We have presented an attacker taxonomy for sensor networks
which has three main classes of attackers: eavesdropping, disruption, and hijacking. So far as we know, our work is the first to
focus on quantifying system-level eavesdropping vulnerability. We
first study a single-level aggregation tree (γ) and then a hierarchical
network (γl ), developing a probabilistic scheme for assessing their
eavesdropping vulnerability. We then consider trading off power
consumption versus security and data quality/accuracy. Finally, we
propose a series of solutions using cryptographic techniques, data
filtering, and attribute correlation.

This paper represents an initial step in a much broader plan.
First, we are extending our model to the disruption and hijacking
models. We are also developing a comprehensive characterization
of common sensor network protocols and aggregation functions
with respect to their robustness. We ultimately hope to consider a
range of other issues, such as unreliable networks, temporary outages, and correlations between the values at different sensors.

8.
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